Брекзит / Brexit
Брекзит / Brexit
In conclusion the author summarizes that David Cameron’s gamble proved a great miscalculation with bad consequences for the UK domestic as well as foreign policy in the near future. He claims that for the settlement of constitutional issues a referendum as an element of direct democracy is not suitable. In 2016, as part of Palgrave Pivot series — which allows for speedy dissemination of medium-size studies brexit новости (around the length of three to six standard journal articles) a book on an important and sensitive topic, both for British and for world politics, was published in the UK. Its author, the British researcher, the senior lecturer of the chair of politics and international relations of Aston University, A. Glenkross prepared substantial, but not deprived of flaws the research within short limits of time.
A. Glenkross aknowledges that the idea to hold a referendum on EU membership penetrated all political spectrum and covered not only Eurosceptics from Conservative party, but also Laborers and Liberal democrats. While analyzing a position of Eurosceptics, the author emphasizes two important aspects, firstly, “the nature of EU membership is somehow unfair or too restrictive for the more free-trade and globally oriented UK”. As a result, the UK had an opt-out from the most constraining aspect of integration, European Monetary Union and its tight fiscal coordination, secondly, “there was no national consent to membership in the political union as on the 1975 referendum British voted for a common market and not a political union”17. As follows from the text of the book, A.
The absence of a British presence in the EU’s decision-making bodies would make trade and regulation policy more protectionist in line with the instincts of French https://www.maximarkets.org/brexit/ governments of both Left and Right. Lastly, a British departure would make the Franco-German tandem once again the be-all and end-all of European integration.
A. Glenkross assumes that D. Cameron was confident of winning the referendum on the basis of a pragmatism and bean-counting evaluation. However, the public opinion “was out of step with the government cost — benefit argument” and “David Cameron’s gamble proved a great miscalculation”4. brexit date The author ranks the 2016 referendum amongst the major political blunders of British Prime Ministers which caused shock waves across Europe and North Atlantic. The decision to delegate responsibility to the people ended up costing him his position as Prime Minister.
“The Prime Minister now in the UK, like David Cameron, like myself, and before that, I mean, we are all in favor of a strong British relationship with China. Even if we go ahead with Brexit, I still think the Chinese relationship will be very important to us. It’s an economic relationship, but it should also should be a political relationship. I supported the government when it joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. I think One Belt One Road is one of the most important things that’s going to be happening in the world in the next 20 years. I think it’s important that we participate as far as we can in that. So the relationship between Britain and China should carry on being a strong one and indeed strengthen, whatever happens with Brexit,” he said. A. Glencross states that on a strategic level, UK’s withdrawal from the EU has a number of important ramifications, many of them potentially favourable to French interests. France’s permanent UN Security Council seat could gain a new legitimacy as the voice of the EU on the international stage.
However, it is not conceivable for the UK to complete new trade deals until it has formally left the EU and clarified its terms of access to the single market35. In the fourth chapter “The EU Referendum Campaign” the author characterizes D. Cameron’s tactic which proved to be effective in 1975 referendum. At that time the British government emphasized economic gains from EEC membership.
“The public expect to be able to hold their governments to account very directly and as a result supranational institutions as strong as those created by the European Union sit very uneasily in relation to our political history and way of life”18. As a consequence, Britain tried to withdraw EU from closer integration and at times have been seen as an awkward member state, explained T.
The future of Northern Ireland is also not certain as the majority of its population has voted against leaving the EU. However, to answer these questions authentically could be possible only by analyzing governmental documents on political strategy as well as final results of negotiations with EU regarding terms of the UK leaving.
- reports and literature available at his disposal.
- According to her, David Cameron’s negotiation was a “valiant final attempt to make it work for Britain” but “the blunt truth” was that “there was not enough flexibility on many important matters for a majority of British voters”19.
- The other “more forgivable error of judgment concerned underestimating the opportunism of certain Conservative cabinet ministers” due to the fact that 6 ministers of the government voted to leave EU.
- The Chinese government is playing for time in Hong Kong in the hope that the demonstrators will lose heart and perhaps the will to resist.
- Secondly, different political traditions of Britain and the EU that delivered discomfort for the British political tradition and for the way of life.
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This also would be consistent with Coase Theorem, in which the initial allocation of property rights doesn’t affect outcomes, as long as bargaining is costless. The https://www.maximarkets.org/ reason the system did not work is because public enforcement of property rights was replaced by a system of private protection and enforcement on segmented markets.
This review essay focuses on the monograph of the British researcher A. Glenkross. It is devoted to the key topic in international discussions — Britain’s exit from the EU. In view of a plenty of the literature appearing brexit now concerning Brexit, A. Glenkross is one of the few scholars who analyzes its political reasons. As follows from the book, the main reasons which have led to the referendum on British membership in EU as well as to D.
It was a negative campaign that did nothing to emphasise the benefits of EU membership as a political or as a peace project (and didn’t even try to present the economic benefits, but only warned about their potential loss). The EU has been coopted by European global economic interests which downplays the European citizen and hence fragments European solidarity. the Continent could “relapse into the old system of power rivalries, reciprocal alliances, and hegemonic head butting.” This will pose a threat to the European order – a “continental system based on economic, political, and legal integration”, which has been the key to peace and prosperity.
The author, contradicting his own statements regarding D. Cameron’s great miscalculation by calling for a new vote on EU, which resulted in the decision for the Great Britain to leave the EU, writes that “the Britain’s political economy also makes it stand out”. He argues as follows. “Consistently large trade deficit of the Great Britain is compensated by equally large capital inflows. This means financial service — namely the City of London — are politically very influential and dominate the economic aspect of relations with the EU”13. The author’s argument that the nature of British exceptionalism within the EU has no nationalist roots could be accepted with no dispute.